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The number of computer attacks increases steadily per year. At the time of this
writing the Internet Security Systems’ baseline assessment is that a new, unpro-
tected computer with an Internet connection will be compromised within one day
or sooner [1]. Intrusion prevention techniques such as encryption and authentica-
tion are usually the first line of defense. In practice however, most of the times
there are weaknesses in the implementation of intrusion prevention and intrusion
detection becomes a second line of defense.
1.2 Change Detection Algorithms
In detection theory if we observe a given stochastic process for a fixed interval of
time, the typical objective is to minimize the error probabilities (probability of
false alarm and probabiliti of missed detection). Optimal detection schemes have
been found, which produce tests that compare the likelihood ratio between the
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given hypotheses with a threshold dependent on the error probabilities.
In classical sequential detection methods the goal is to find optimal solutions
to a hypothesis testing problem while accounting for trade-offs between the prob-
ability of error and the decision time. This problem is typically formulated as
a Markov stopping time and the usual test is a sequential probability ratio test
(SPRT). A more specific problem within sequential detection that we will also
consider is the quickest change detection, where the trade-off is between the delay
of detection and the false alarm rate.
Most of the presentation of these problems and formulations follows [2].
1.2.1 Sequential detection
We will assume that we are observing a discrete time stochastic process (Xk)k≥1.
We say that a test ζ = (g, T ) is a sequential probability ratio test (SPRT) for
testing between simple hypotheses H0 = {θ : θ = θ0} and H1 = {θ : θ = θ1} if
we sequentially observe data and if for each time k we make one of the following
decisions
• accept H0 when Zk ≤ a
• accept H1 when Zk ≥ h











is the log likelihood ratio function of the two hypotheses. Xk1 = {X1, ..., Xk},





1, when ZT ≥ h
0, when ZT ≤ a
(1.2)
where T is the exit time
T = Ta,h = min{n ≥ 1 : (Zn ≥ h) ∪ (Zn ≤ a)} (1.3)
Wald’s sequential probability ratio test (SPRT) is optimal for binary hypotheses
testing (M=2) between two independent distributions in the sense that it simulta-
neously minimizes both expectations of the sample size among all tests for which
the probabilities of error do not exceed predefined values.
1.2.2 Optimal change detection algorithms
Despite the abundance of techniques addressing the change detection problem,
optimum schemes can mostly be found for the case where the data are independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) and the distributions are completely known
before and after the change time k0 [3].
The cumulative sum (CUSUM) and the Shiryaev-Roberts statistics are the two
most commonly used algorithms for change detection problems.
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1.2.2.1 CUSUM algorithm
For the i.i.d. case, the CUSUM algorithm minimizes (non asymptotic optimality)
the following objective function
F (T ) = sup
k0≥1
ess supEk0[(T − k0 + 1)+|x1, ..., xk−1] (1.4)
(where (x)+denotes max{0, x}) among all stopping times subject to the false alarm












and the stopping time is:
T = inf
k
{k : Zk −mk ≥ h} (1.8)
for a given threshold h satisfying the false alarm constraint.
It can be shown that Zk −mk satisfies the recursion Zk −mk = (Zk−1−mk−1 +
zk)
+ with Z0 −m0 = 0.
1.2.2.2 Shiryaev-Roberts statistic
For the i.i.d. case, the Shiryaev-Roberts statistic minimizes (non asymptotic opti-
mality) the objective function
F (T ) = sup
k≥1
Ek[T − k0|T ≥ k0] (1.9)
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subject also to a given false alarm rate. The algorithm is computed by the recursion
Rn = (1 +Rn−1)ezi with R0 = 0 (1.10)
The stopping time is given by
T = inf
n
{n : log(Rn) ≥ h} (1.11)
1.2.2.3 Algorithm with a prior of the change time
There is a final optimal algorithm for i.i.d. observations proposed by Shiryaev that
minimizes the objective function
F (T ) = E{1{T<k0} + c(T − k0)+} (1.12)
where c represents the cost of each “extra” observation after the change time k0
and 1( )is the indicator function. The algorithm assumes a geometric prior for the
change time. The optimal stopping rule consists in stopping the first time the
posterior probability of the change time exceeds some constant threshold.
1.2.3 Nonparametric CUSUM and Gishik-Rubin-Shiryaev Statistics
Most change detection algorithms applied to network traffic use nonparametric
statistics as it is very complicated to know or model the pre-change and post-change
distributions of an observation of the network flow at all times by parametric
families.
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The non-parametric version of the CUSUM assumes a random process with
some regularity conditions. The form of the process is
xk = a+ ξk1(k<k0) + (b− ψk)1(k≥k0) (1.13)
where E[ξk] = E[ψk] = 0, b+ a > 0 , a < 0 and 1( )is the indicator function.
The statistic for such a sequence is
Sk = (Sk−1 + xk)+, S0 = 0 (1.14)
and the corresponding decision rule is
T = inf
n
{n : Sn > h} (1.15)
for a given threshold h selected based on the false alarm rate.
The nonparametric version equivalent to the Shiryaev-Roberts statistic is the
Gishik-Rubin-Shiryaev statistic [4].
1.2.4 GLR for composite hypothesis and nuisance parameters
The case of composite hypotheses is more useful and important from a practical
point of view. Unfortunately, this case is much more complicated and there are
fewer available theoretical results than in the case of simple hypotheses.
Two possible solutions for the case of composite hypotheses are the generalized
likelihood ratio (GLR) and the average over the prior distribution of the composite
and nuisance parameters.
6
The precise optimal properties of the GLR test in the general case are unknown,
but for many special cases, the GLR test is optimal and therefore it will be our
preferred choice.
To present the algorithm consider the case where the parameter θ1 after the
change is unknown and before the change θ0 is known. The log-likelihood ratio for
observations from time j up to time k is




so the ratio is a function of two unknown independent parameters: the change
time and the value of the parameter after the change. The standard statistical
approach is to use the maximum likelihood estimates of these two parameters, and






1.3 Network definitions and algorithms
The network topology will play an important role in the chapter on worm detection
so we will include some basic definitions.
Various classes of graphs (networks) have recently attracted attention in rela-
tion to various dynamic properties of the Internet and other complex networks.
One of the first network models studied is the Erdós − Rényi random graph
model, where one starts with N nodes and connects every pair of nodes with
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probability p, ending up with a graph with approximately pN(N − 1)/2 edges
distributed randomly, and with the typical distance (hop count) between two nodes
scaling as log(N). Another important parameter in the description of a network
is the node degree, i.e. the number of edges (links) emanating from a node. The
important discriminant is the degree distribution:
Pr[a randomly selected node has k edges]:=P (k)
In a random graph the majority of the nodes have approximately the same
degree, close to the average degree of the network kav, and the degree distribution
is Poisson. On the other hand, in most real large networks such as the router graph
on the Internet and the WWW graph, the degree distribution deviates significantly
from a Poisson distribution. It has a power law tail P (k) ≈ k−γ. Such networks
are often called scale-free networks.
A key parameter in the analysis and discrimination between graphs is the
clustering coefficient of a node i, characterized by the number of edges Ei between
all neighbors ki over all possible edges among them ki(ki − 1)/2.
A good overview of these topics including the basic algorithms to generate




2.1 Description of the Attack
Worms are programs that self-propagate across a network by exploiting security
flaws in widely-used services offered by vulnerable computers. In order to locate
the vulnerable computers, the worm probes different computer addresses at the
specific port number of the service it is looking for. By exploiting the security
flaw in the service, the worm usually can execute arbitrary code with elevated
privileges, allowing it to copy and execute itself in the compromised machine. In
order to reproduce, the worm scans for new vulnerable machines from each new
compromised computer.
There are other types of worms that we will not consider: for example email
worms (viruses) such as Melissa, which require some sort of user action to abet
their propagation. As such they tend to propagate more slowly and are easier to
detect.
Worms are popular attacks because no other mechanism allows for the rapid
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and widespread distribution of malicious code, with virtually no way to trace the
attacker.
We will focus on the description of some worms to clarify the concepts:
2.1.1 Examples of self-propagating code in the Internet
The second half of 2001 witnessed the appearance of three major worms with a
high infection success.
• Code Red I (v2) was originally detected in July 19, 2001. The same day
it was reported that more than 250,000 machines were infected in just 9
hours. This worm exploits a security flaw in Microsoft IIS web servers (the
.ida vulnerability.) Once it infects a host, it spreads by launching 99 threads
which generate uniformly random IP addresses. Each of these 99 threads
probed the destination computers to determine if the service was accessi-
ble. After the 3 TCP way handshake, it uploads all the code, waits for the
acknowledgment and moves on to infect other computers.
• Code Red II was originally detected in August 2001. It exploited the same
vulnerability as Code Red I. If the language installed in the system was
Chinese, it ran 600 threads and spread for 48 hours, otherwise it ran 300
threads and spread for 24 hours. The scanning of each thread was different
from that of Code Red I. It attempted to infect computers with addresses
close to the infected machine. With probability 4/8 it probed an address in
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the same class A network, with probability 3/8 it probed the same class B
network and with probability 1/8 it probed an address in the whole Internet.
This worm died by design by rebooting its host machines after October 2001.
• Nimda was detected on September 2001. It has been called a hybrid worm
because it tries to spread by different means such as probing web servers,
mass emailing, and by scanning for the back-doors left behind by Code Red
II.
Even though Code Red I and Nimda are still very popular, there are new worms
being released in the Internet very often. Here we mention two recent examples to
show the prevalence of this threat to date:
• The SQL Spida worm follows the footsteps of Nimda and Code Red. It was
detected in May 2002. Once a vulnerable SQL server is found, the worm
will infect that target and begin scanning for new targets. The scanner
bundled with the worm is multi-threaded. It searches for uniformly random
IP addresses over the Internet.
• Slapper was detected in September 2002. It spread rapidly throughout the
Internet, affecting over 20,000 vulnerable servers within 72 hours. It exploits
an OpenSSL buffer overflow vulnerability in Apache web servers. The worm
attacks by sending an initial HTTP request to port 80 (HTTP) and examin-
ing the Server header response. Only if the target server is running certain
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Linux distributions it will proceed to connect to port 443 (HTTPs) to send
the exploit code to the SSL service that is listening on the remote computer.
2.2 Why is it important to detect worms early in their de-
velopment?
In the latest Internet Risk Impact Summary report published by ISS at the time
of this writing [1], the prevalence and increase of computer attacks using worms
was emphasized. The top three categories of computer attacks are directly related
to worms and other self-propagating hybrid threats which exploit multiple vulner-
abilities across desktops and servers. In addition, the worm attacks of Code Red
and Nimda were selected as the top worst security attacks in the last five years [6].
We would like to detect a worm as soon as possible in order to minimize the
number of compromised hosts. A case example was that the quick discovery and
prompt action by System Administrators prohibited Slapper from spreading fur-
ther and prevented its damage [1]. Some highly contagious worms can also induce
side effects such as BGP routing instabilities when they reach their peak.
Currently, however, detection usually relies on informal email discussion on a
few key mailing lists. This process takes hours at a minimum, which is very slow
for the rapidly-propagating worms.
Furthermore in [7] it is stated that the spread of the theoretical flash or Warhol
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worms will be so fast that no human-driven communication will suffice for adequate
identification of an outbreak before nearly complete infection is achieved. It is
therefore proposed to sponsor research in automated mechanisms for detecting
worms based on their traffic patterns. The appearance of such a worm was selected
as the greatest security threat in the Internet [6].
2.3 Detection algorithms
Although the spread of a worm increases traffic over a network, the worm itself is
small (Code Red was 4KB), and it only takes 40 bytes for a TCP SYN packet to
determine if a service is accessible, so detection cannot rely on bandwidth statistics.
Furthermore, detection based on side effects such as the use of host unreachable
messages and connection attempts to routers as a way of detecting worms will be
less reliable while the worm is getting off the ground if it uses a hit-list scanning
[7].
We will focus on the fact that the self propagating code will try to use specific
vulnerabilities that can be identified with certain port numbers. So in the rest of
this chapter we will assume that the traffic monitoring variable is the connection
attempts (probes) to a given TCP/UDP port number(s). We will also assume most
of the time a probability distribution on the traffic observations. Such probability
can be of the form Pr(Number of probes to a given port number | A service is
provided in such a port). So in our framework we assume that there is a baseline of
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connections to the given monitored port in all sensors (computers) of the network.
The observations can be made at different participating ISPs enforcing policies for
blocking self-propagating code once it is detected.
We will explore the effect of aggregation from distributed sensors. This ap-
proach is motivated by the current infrastructure of distributed Intrusion Detec-
tion Systems such as myNetwatchman, Dshield and Symantec’s DeepSight Threat
Management System. Another motivation is presented in [7] as the authors pro-
pose to foster the deployment of a widespread set of sensors for worm detection
(possibly in the Internet backbone.)
2.3.1 Detection of a change in the mean
Clearly the simplest approach to change detection is to detect a change in the mean.
We will denote by {Xl,k} the observed stochastic process at sensor l ∈ {1, ..., L}





2.3.1.1 Change detection in distributed sensor systems
In this first approach we will assume that each sequence {Xl,k} is i.i.d. with pdf
f
(0)
l before and f
(1)
l after the change. Furthermore, in traditional distributed detec-
tion it is assumed that the observation sequences {X1,k}, ..., {XL,k} are mutually




l (x1,k) for i ∈ {0, 1} in order to keep
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the problem tractable. In our case we can assume the independenve condition
among sensors holds when the worm scans randomly the whole network monitored
by the sensors i.e. the worm has no scanning preference between sensors.
Based on the information available at time k a message Vl,k depending on Xl,k
is sent to the fusion center. We want to find a stopping time T ∈  + minimizing
sup
1≤ko<∞
Eko{(T − ko)m|T ≥ ko} (2.2)
for all m, (where k0 is the unknown change time) subject to a false alarm rate
1/E∞[T ] < Fa. It was shown in [8] that the optimal message (in the asymptotic
case when Fa → 0) Vl,k is completely determined by threshold comparisons of the




l (Xl,k) ≤ βVl+1 (note the inde-
pendence on V on k). It is of importance in traditional detection over distributed
sensors to minimize the transmission bandwidth, so Vl,k is usually a quantized ob-




l (Xl,k) by the thresholds βVl . In
the limit case, the sensor will not send anything (0) if the likelihood ratio is below
a certain threshold, and will send an alarm (1) if it is greater than a threshold β.
In our case since bandwidth is not a limiting factor we will send the likelihood (or
log-likelihood) evaluation to the fusion center.
The message Vl,k will have an induced distribution g
(i)
l when the observation
Xl,k is distributed as f
(i)














R(k) = (1 +R(k − 1))eZ(k), R(0) = 0 (2.4)
T (Fa) = inf{k ≥ 1 : R(k) ≥ 1/Fa} (2.5)
We will assume that f
(0)




















It is then clear that the thresholds comparisons of the likelihood are reduced to





1, if xl,k >
log β+λ1,l−λ0,l
log λ1,l−log λ0,l
0, if xl,k ≤ log β+λ1,l−λ0,llog λ1,l−log λ0,l
(2.6)
In the asymptotic case, in which we do not care about bandwidth constraints and
are allowed to use an arbitrarily large message alphabet, g
(i)
l → f (i)l .
2.3.1.2 CUSUM of aggregated traffic
For this approach we send xl,k directly to the fusion center, without computing
the local likelihood. Again, we will assume i.i.d. distributions at the sensors with
f
(i)





. It is known that the aggregate Xk will be distributed as








l=1 λi,l (i ∈ {0, 1}). The log-likelihood ratio at the fusion cen-
ter needed to apply the CUSUM algorithm presented in the introduction is thus







Figure 2.1: Code Red I Infection (source CAIDA)
2.3.2 Detection of an exponential signal in noise
The i.i.d. assumption of the observations after the change is not valid because
each infected host will try in general to scan the same number of hosts in a given
interval of time, and as more and more hosts become infected xl,k will increase with
k. In particular we know from simple population dynamic models that a worm
scanning uniformly randomly the whole network will follow a logistic growth [7].
In figure 2.1 we see the number of infected hosts by Cod Red I during its first
day. In figure 2.2 we see the growth in number of probes by the worm w32.Leave.
Let η be the population of infected hosts. Let r be the intrinsic growth rate
(the growth rate when η(t) is small) and let a be a given positive constant. Then
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Figure 2.2: Number of probes due to the w32.Leave worm
the logistic growth satisfies the nonlinear ordinary differential equation
dη
dt




N0 + (B −N0)e−rt (2.9)
where B = r/a and N0 is the population at time 0. Since we are interested in
detecting a worm as soon as possible we look at the behavior of η(t) when it is
small, i.e. we consider the exponential growth
η(t) = N0e
rt (2.10)




(d stands for “discrete”) where m is the discretized growth rate when ηd is small
and N0 is the number of hosts compromised at k = 0. The discretized version of
the continuous time equation (2.10) is
η(k∆t) := ηk = N0e
rk (2.12)
We can see that ηk matches η
d
k when r = log(m). We can use ηk and η
d
k inter-
changeably although for the cases in which we need integer values, ηdk will be easier
to use.
For the detection problem we will assume that the values of N0 and r (or m) are
unknown. Moreover we will consider that the normal traffic Wl,k at each sensor l,
is distributed under a (probably unknown) distribution f
(0)
l (wl,1, ..., wl,k) for k ∈ 





distributed as f (0)(w1, ..., wk).
Our main assumption in this section is that the number of probes seen at
the sensors will be proportional to the number of infected hosts αηdk. The usual
change detection hypothesis testing problem for the aggregate traffic (2.1) would
be as follows:
H0 : xk = wk when 1 ≤ k ≤M
H1 :
xk = wk when 1 ≤ k < k0
xk = αη
d
k + wk when k0 ≤ k ≤M
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However, we want k to restart to 1 whenever H0 is accepted, so we use a
sequential hypothesis testing where the change time k0 is implicitly given by the
time in which the sequential test restarted and H1 was accepted.
H0 : xk = wk when 1 ≤ k ≤M
H1 : xk = αη
d
k + wk when 1 ≤ k ≤M
In order to detect a signal in noise we must compute the generalized likelihood
ratio in the time window [1,...,M] and compare it to the threshold h. To accom-
modate different growth rates, the intervals ∆t of the time steps k can increase or
decrease.
2.3.2.1 Exponential signal detection in noise








Note that the parameters α and N0 can be combined into a single parameter A0
for the optimization problem.






. So under H0, Xk is then distributed as









The discrete noise distribution presents the problem that the optimization al-
gorithm in (2.14) has to restrict αηdk to integer values. Note that in this case
∀(A0, m), ∀(k, j)
(




xj − ηdj (A0, m)
)
. So we can
compute the likelihood ratio for each time step k. The likelihood ratio function for











0 xk(xk − 1) · · · (xk − A0mk + 1). (2.16)












The maximization is subject to the constraints xk−A0mk ≥ 0, m > 1 and A0mk ∈
 
+. This equation cannot be solved assuming continuous variables and rounding
up or down the optimum values found. We must therefore rely on combinatorial
optimization.
2.3.2.2 Exponential change in the mean
In this subsection we will assume the same noise model as in subsection 2.3.2.1. We
will assume that the mean of f (0) varies with respect to k via an exponential growth
model. The advantage of this approach is that we can use standard optimization
algorithms over k for the GLR method, as the mean can take any real value. The
disadvantage of this approach is that it is not truly a problem of signal detection
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in noise. Furthermore for certain discrete random variables such as those with a
Poisson distribution, if the mean changes the variance also changes.
Under the first approach to H1: the exponential growth in the mean, Xk will
be distributed as







where the dependence on the unknown nuisance parameters A0 and r is stated ex-






However since the signal we are trying to detect is exponential we prefer to avoid
the maximization step over k and use a batch approach with a sliding window of
size M. Note that given fixed (A0, m), for all (k, j)k 
= j (xk) is independent of
(xj), so we can compute the likelihood ratio for each time step k. The likelihood
































The maximization is subject to the constraints A > c1 and r > c2, where c1 and
c2 are two given positive constants.
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2.3.2.3 Nonparametric regression detection
So far we have always been assuming a parametric distribution f (0)(w1, ..., wk) for
the normal traffic. This assumption is valid for a wide number of ports as the
traffic seen can be regular. However in some cases the real distribution can be
quite difficult to obtain. For example the number of probes seen to port 80 (http)
or port 21 (ftp) for computers providing those services can exhibit long range
dependence and multifractal behavior.
In order to deal with some of the more complicated problems, in particular
those where no clear mean of f (0)(w1, ..., wk) can be established, we propose a
nonparametric change detection algorithm.
The idea is to do a linear regression on log(xi). This regression will produce
two parameters, a slope ck and the error errk from the estimated regression of
xk−M+1, ..., xk. From this we compute the statistic zk = ck/errk. We use a sliding
window over k to compute the statistic. Then we apply the non-parametric version
of CUSUM or the Girshik-Rubin-Shiryaev algorithms to zk.
2.4 Simulation
2.4.1 Worm simulation
We created different scale-free network topologies with a delay of one unit step per
edge for simulating the communication among different nodes. One of our main
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Figure 2.3: One of the Simulated Networks with 540nodes
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algorithms was a modification to the Albert − Barabási (AB) algorithm [5]. In
this setup we build a cluster of nodes using the (AB) algorithm of size Lcluster
where each new node is included with degree dcluster. Afterward we add LAS nodes
(LAS = 4 in our simulations) with two edges connecting them to random nodes
in the cluster. From this point forward we continue to include nodes of degree
1 selecting an edge from any node except from the node in the clusters, so this
growth simulates the creation of 4 autonomous systems (AS) connected through a
high degree cluster. At the end the LAS nodes (selected among all nodes created
after the first Lcluster + LAS nodes) with the highest degree are connected to the
high degree cluster to reduce the bottlenecks from nodes in the subnetworks to
reach the cluster. A typical result of this algorithm is shown in figure 2.3.
The simulations can be placed in the framework of the distributed IDS pre-
sented such as myNetwatchman and Symantec’s Deep Sight Threat Management
system. Each node represents the IDS of a given subnetwork and the worm scans
different computers in different subnetworks until it finds a vulnerable machine.
However the simulation environment we present is more closely related to the
widespread of sensors in the Internet backbone [7], because each node acts as a
router and will see transit probes (e.g. a leaf router). Under this framework the
worm spreads by using hit-list scanning because all the initial probes find a vul-
nerable machine. Therefore no attack probe is wasted scanning immune machines.
For the normal flow model, each node tries to send a normal probe every T
units of time to a uniformly randomly selected node in the network. Each node
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sends the probes independent of any other node. T was assumed to be a random
variable either Exponential (with time delay equal to the average round trip time
of the network) or Pareto distributed (with parameters a=1.5 and b=1). At the
change time there is only one abnormal node. The node tries to contact another
node at random to reproduce the worm. The malicious node then waits four round
trip times to start searching for another vulnerable node. This waiting time was
selected as a model of the three way handshaking plus the small upload of the
worm found in real networks. In figure 2.4, the first subfigure shows the time in
which each particular node got infected. The second subfigure shows the number
of infected hosts. The infection starts at time 500 and by time 750 more than 85%
of the nodes are infected.
2.4.2 Application of the detection algorithms
• By “fusion” we refer to the algorithm presented in section 2.3.1.1. The mean
λ0,l of the assumed Poisson distribution g
(0)
l was estimated during the first
200 time steps for all l. The mean of the anomalous Poisson distribution was
set arbitrarily to λ1,l = 1.2λ0,l.
• By “aggregate cusum” we refer to the algorithm of section 2.3.1.2. The
mean λ0 of the assumed Poisson distribution f
(0) was again estimated for
the aggregate traffic during the first 200 time steps. The anomalous Poisson
distribution was also set to λ1 = 1.2λ0.
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Figure 2.4: Infection time
Figure 2.5: Number of probes at the 12 highest degree nodes.
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• By “exponential in noise” we refer to the algorithm of section 2.3.2.1. We
used combinatorial optimization for different time windows as the optimiza-
tion function in equation (2.17) cannot be maximized using continuous vari-
ables and rounding up at the end. The integer restriction gives us a prob-
lem, as mk for m ∈ {2, 3, ...} and k ∈  grows extremely fast. Our solution
was to select two windows. In the first window of length 5 the median of
Xk−4, Xk−3, Xk−2, Xk−1, Xk is obtained as X̂k. The second window of length
4 is taken among X̂k−3, X̂k−2, X̂k−1, X̂k. It is in this window that the opti-
mization in equation (2.17) takes place.
• By “exponential change in mean” we refer to the algorithm of section 2.3.2.2.
A variant of this algorithm was obtained by setting A0 fixed and maximizing
over r. The nonparametric CUSUM algorithm was applied to the optimal
estimate r̂. This algorithm will be called “r nonparam cusum”. Proving the
concavity of the function we want to maximize (equation (2.20)) is very diffi-
cult. We instead computed the Hessian and checked if it is negative definite
at the solution of the gradient. For the simple case of fixed A0 the gra-
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, so the optimization relies on solving a non-









we optimize also with respect to A0 the problem is reduced to solving a set
of nonlinear equations, but we used mostly optimization methods without
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the gradient computations.
• By “regression” we refer to the algorithm presented in section 2.3.2.3. A
variant of this algorithm is called “robust regression”, and was obtained by
using the iterated weighted least squares estimate of the slope. This robust
approach was selected as a way to cope with outliers without including di-
rectly the error (in the least square fit) in the change statistic. The slope
crobustk obtained at each time window [k−M+1, ..., k] was used as the stochas-
tic process for the nonparametric CUSUM algorithm.
2.4.3 Detection results
The following detection delay plots are the worst case detection delay as all change
detection statistics are reinitialized to zero at the time of infection. Furthermore
all detection delays were obtained by averaging 10 runs.
Our first performance metric was the detection delay vs the number of sensors
under an exponential waiting time for the normal traffic. The sensors were picked
in order starting from the highest degree nodes. Surprisingly, for our simulated
network in figure 2.3, the detection delay does not seem to decrease monotonically
as the number of sensors increases, or even with different network sizes, except for
the regression statistics (figure 2.7.)
According to our network construction algorithm we have four subnetworks
and each is connected on average by two gateways to the highly connected cluster
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Figure 2.6: Detection delay vs high degree node aggregation, 540 nodes.
and thus any node within that subnetwork trying to reach a node outside will send
packets through this gateways so they tend to contain most of the traffic. To test if
the result was a consequence of our four subnetwork constructions we generated a
scale-free network based on the original (AB) algorithm. During the construction
each new node is attached to the network with m edges. For the figure 2.8 we
chose m = 2.
The results seem to suggest that in a general scale-free network a very small
set of the highly connected nodes is enough to detect any global variation on
the network flow, and that increasing the number of sensors does not on average
decrease -or increase- the detection delay, in fact on average it remains constant.
However if the sensors are picked at random then aggregation helps according
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Figure 2.7: Detection delay vs high degree node aggregation, 120 nodes
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Figure 2.8: Detection delay vs high degree node aggregation for (AB) network
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Figure 2.9: Detection delay vs node aggregation selecting the nodes at random
to figure 2.9.
Furthermore if we select the highest degree nodes in a random network (random
graph), the aggregation also helps. See figure 2.10.
Partial answers can be found by the degree distribution in figure 2.11 of our
original 540 node network. As should be expected very few nodes have a high
degree that captures most of the traffic in the network. The high degree nodes for
the original 540 node network are given in table 2.1. This is consistent with the
heavy tailed degree distribution of the (AB) model network in figure 2.12. The
degree distribution of a random network follows a Poisson distribution and thus
the number of high degree nodes is larger (figure 2.13.)
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Figure 2.10: Detection delay vs high degree node aggregation in a random network.
Figure 2.11: Degree distribution of the 540 node network
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Figure 2.12: Degree distribution of a 540 node network created with the (AB)
algorithm
Figure 2.13: Degree distribution of a random network
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Node 42 41 44 89 43 56 55 135 87 4
Degree 50 42 25 14 14 13 13 12 11 11
Table 2.1: High degree nodes for the network in figure 2.3
So far most of the statistics have performed similarly except for “regression”,
“robust regression” and the “r nonparam cusum”. The “exp in noise” statistic
also suffers when the nodes aggregated are selected at random (figure 2.9) and in
a random network (figure 2.10.) This result is due to the constrained optimization
as discussed before. When we aggregate random sensors in a scale-free network,
or when we monitor any node in a random network, the aggregated overall traffic
is smaller and thus it is very difficult to fit a fast exponentially increasing function
(equation (2.17)) in small intervals.
To test the effectiveness of the nonparametric statistics we then simulated the
waiting time of the normal traffic with the Pareto distribution (see figures 2.14
and 2.15).
The detection delay vs the average time for false alarm can be seen in figures
2.16, 2.17 and 2.18.
2.5 Conclusions
In scale-free networks a very small set of the highly connected nodes is sufficient
for detection and aggregation only improves the performance of the nonparametric
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Figure 2.14: Detection delay under Pareto traffic 540 node network
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Figure 2.15: Detection delay under Pareto traffic 640 node network
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exponential change in mean
exponential in noise
Figure 2.16: Detection delay vs false alarm rate 540 node network.






















exponential change in mean
exponential in noise
Figure 2.17: Detection delay vs false alarm rate (AB) network
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Figure 2.18: Detection delay vs false alarm rate for a random network
statistics. If we select sensors at random or if we monitor a random network
then aggregation is very important for detection. Most of the parametric statistics
perform comparably under a wide variety of conditions. The best performance
on average is always obtained by the statistics measuring a change in the mean,
mainly “fusion”, “aggregate CUSUM” and “exponential change in mean”. When
the traffic deviates significantly from the assumed traffic distribution, the best
performance is produced by the nonparametric statistics “regression” and “robust
regression”.
The large variability in the aggregation can be accounted in part to the small
spikes that cross the threshold before the real statistic grows (lucky alarms). For
40
Figure 2.19: Fusion statistic under Pareto traffic
example in figure 2.19 the alarm was set at time 610, even when the real growth
in the statistic was after time 650.
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Chapter 3
Detection of Distributed Denial of Service Attacks
3.1 Description of the attack
A denial of service attack (DoS) can be defined as an attack designed to disrupt
or completely deny legitimate users’ access to networks, servers, services or other
resources. The most common DoS attack involves sending a large number of pack-
ets to a destination causing excessive amounts of network endpoint bandwidth to
be consumed and (or) cpu processing rate at the destination.
In a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack typically an attacker compro-
mises a set of Internet hosts (using manual or semiautomated methods like a worm)
Figure 3.1: The attacker creates a zombie army to flood a target.
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and installs a small attack daemon on each host, producing a group of ”zombies”
(figure 3.1). This daemon typically contains both the code for producing a variety
of attacks and some basic communications infrastructure to allow for remote con-
trol. Using variants of this basic architecture an attacker can focus a coordinated
attack from thousands of zombies installed across different autonomous systems
(AS) boundaries, onto a single site causing excessive amounts of endpoint and
possibly transit network bandwidth to be consumed [9].
3.1.1 Persistence and characterization of DDoS attacks
In [10] an estimate of 12,805 attacks was provided over the course of three weeks
in February 2001. Most of the attacks were short, 50% were less than 10 minutes
and 80% were less than 30 minutes. However the tail of the distribution was long:
1% of the attacks were greater than 10 hours. Although most of the attacks are
targeted against home machines, suggesting that minor DDoS are used to settle
personal vendettas, there is a small but significant fraction of attacks directed
against network infrastructure. 2-3% of attacks target domain name servers (DNS)
and 1-3%, target routers (with a disproportionately large number of packets.)
According to Alan Paller, director of the SANS Institute, DDoS attacks are
not going to be solved because we get some new hardware in the system, but by
re-engineering the whole Internet.
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3.1.2 Recent examples of DDoS attacks
One of the more complex and elaborate DDoS attacks was the attack on October
22, 2002 to the 13 main DNS root servers. The attack flooded with ICMP messages
the 13 DNS root servers around the world with more than 10 times the normal
amount of data. Seven of the servers were affected enough to have periods of “zero-
reachability”. It took about an hour for security specialists to enact defensive
measures and restore service. The attack failed to disrupt service because the data
on the 13 key servers is replicated tens of thousands of times by ISPs and other
computers around the world. Only an estimated 6% of the requests reached the
root DNS servers. These attacks were easy to defend against because they relied on
a simple ICMP flood which is not typically seen in very high volumes. Instead of
sending a flood of packets that all use the same protocol, attackers usually disguise
a DDoS attack as normal traffic. In such an attack, nothing about the protocols
used or the packets sent would appear unusual, but the volume of traffic would be
enough to overwhelm the targeted server. Even more pernicious would be attacks
that target the routing infrastructure (as opposed to the DNS infrastructure) of
the Internet according to security engineers at Arbor Networks.
3.1.3 Related work
Several vendors offer early-detection and response tools for dealing with DoS at-
tacks. The main focus of such technologies is to quickly give IT managers the
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information needed to filter out malicious traffic while letting in legitimate users.
Most of these products work by comparing live network traffic against some
previously defined baseline and by alerting users if there is a significant divergence
from that baseline. The alerts might be based on a comparison of byte or packet
rates, traffic that’s directed at specific resources, traffic that originates from specific
IP addresses or spikes in network traffic.
The change detection approach to detect denial of service attacks has also been
addressed in [11, 12] where the detection is done at the victim’s network. We will
try to present new algorithms for the detection in the upstream “transit” network.
3.2 Why is it important to quickly detect routers participat-
ing in a denial of service attack?
Almost all DDoS attacks involve multiple networks and attack sources, many of
which have spoofed IP addresses to make detection even harder. So completely
choking off the offending traffic requires network administrators to call upstream
service providers, alerting them of the attack and having them shut down the
traffic. That process has to be repeated all the way back to every attack source.
So although DDoS are easily identified at the victim’s site, it is natural to extend
the quickest detection problem to the transit network.
There are various techniques and ideas for mitigation of denial of service attacks
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that require the identification of the routers participating (involuntarily) in the
attack. Most of these techniques consume a significant amount of router resources
so it is advisable to use them only when needed. Some examples that are provided
in some Cisco Routers are TCP Intercept and Committed Access Rate. Some
related work is also presented in [13, 14] where the key step in the proposed denial
of service mitigation algorithm consists in identifying the routers forwarding the
malicious traffic.
Network administrative policy influences how the nodes are monitored and
what to do once we start correlating alarms. Does it make sense to monitor all
routers? Or does this monitoring consume too many resources? Are the nodes
monitored computing the statistics necessary to detect a local change by them-
selves? Or are they sending all the information (packets per link) to compute the
statistics at the network-operating center (a fusion center). A reasonable assump-
tion for transit networks carrying a lot of traffic which cannot be analyzed at line
rate, is that routers do not keep the number of packets to a specific destination,
as this might be too expensive during operation. Thus we are interested only in
passively monitoring the network.
3.3 Detection Algorithms
Our main goal is to attempt a first approach to the problem of detecting when a
distributed denial of service attack is taking place in one sub-network of a transit
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(core) network comprised only of routers.
Parametric and non-parametric change detection algorithms are applied to the
problem of detecting changes in the direction of traffic flow. The directionality of
the change in a network flow is assumed to have an objective or target. We are
interested in the quickest detection problem when the attack is distributed and
coordinated from several nodes against a targeted one.
We use a directionality framework, which gives us a way to compute the sever-
ity and directionality of the change. The severity represents a composite M-ary
sequential hypothesis test that is easily solved under Gaussian assumptions.
We finally introduce a heuristic distributed change detection mechanism for
correlating the alarms in a subset of monitored nodes. Given an alarm as a pair
(direction and severity) we correlate the severity of the alarms with alarms from
other nodes in the same direction. And we show that this is equivalent to another
M-ary sequential detection problem among the routers.
3.3.1 Problem formulation
We take a new approach for identifying Distributed Denial of Service attacks by a
set of nodes in a transit network. The basic idea is that at each highly connected
node, the data tends to aggregate from the distributed sources toward the desti-
nation, giving a sense of directionality to the attack. This directionality idea will
provide us a framework to design change detection algorithms that are going to be
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less sensitive to changes in the average intensity of the overall traffic and will focus
on differentiating the different random fluctuations of the network traffic versus
fluctuations where there is a clear change in the direction of the flow at a given
node. We are considering packets in a very broad and general way, but clearly
our approach can be extended to monitor certain specific packet types given the
protocol. For example we might be interested in measuring only TCP SYN-ACK
response packets for identifying a reflected distributed denial of service attack, or
ICMP packets for identifying ping floods.
Let’s assume we are monitoring node d in figure 3.2. Let Xd,mk denote the
stochastic process representing the total number of packets sent by d through the
link (d,m) (an ordered pair) at time step k, where m ∈ N (d) denotes a neighbor of

















We will be interested in changes of the form:
θd0 + νΥm (3.2)
where ν is a non-negative scalar and Υm (in the case of three observed links
|N (d)| = 3) is one of the usual basis vectors of the three dimensional Euclidean
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So in figure 3.2, if node d suddenly starts a broadcast, there will be a change in the
mean of all processes. However we are not interested in such a change. Instead if
there are attackers in the subnetworks attached to b and c, and they target a host
in the network attached to a by flooding it, there will be a change in the direction
Υa. Testing directions should help us in discriminating unwanted false alarms due
to random fluctuations of the flows.
To formalize our ideas we consider the framework discussed in [2] of change
detection in a known direction but unknown magnitude of the change. Our problem
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is a little bit different in that we are considering an M-ary sequential hypothesis
testing problem and that we will not allow changes with negative or zero values
for ν, i.e. we impose the restriction ν ≥ 0.




θd0 when k < tchange
θd0 + νΥa or
θd0 + νΥb or
θd0 + νΥc when k ≥ tchange
(3.4)
where tchange is an unknown time step when the change occurs.
Since we have an unknown parameter ν we follow the GLR approach from the
introduction. We run in parallel a GLR for each possible direction Υm versus the













Only the test gd,mk that reaches its given threshold is stopped. The threshold h
d,m
for each of the parallel tests is selected given a fixed false alarm rate probability.
Equation (3.5) has a nice closed form solution when the distributions are as-













Xdi − θd0 − νΥm
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(3.6)
















If the restriction is active then v̂d,mk = 0.
The intuitive idea of this approach is that you are projecting the difference
between all available sample means and the mean θd0 (or historic mean estimate for
practical purposes) into each of the possible directions Υm, and selecting the time
step of this projection that maximizes the likelihood of the alternate hypothesis
assuming θd0 + v̂
d,m
k (j)Υm, i.e. when we think the sample mean started moving in
the Υm direction. The uncorrelated covariance (in our case) is just a weighting
parameter for being cautious about declaring a change in the mean too soon if the
process is observed to have large fluctuations around the mean.
We tested the robustness of this approach even when the distribution was not
Gaussian, as long as we are computing the mean and covariance in a window of
time, much bigger than our false alarm delay, to keep mean and covariance up to
date and only detect abrupt changes. Recall that in the worm detection chapter
we computed the mean only once.
Following most change detection approaches applied to network traffic [11, 12],
we also use the nonparametric CUSUM test for each link independently: Sd,mk =
max{0, Sd,mk −Xd,mk −Nd,mk − cd,mk }, where cd,mk is a positive deterministic sequence
chosen experimentally to minimize the average detection delay and Nd,mk is the





So far we have been focusing on detecting a change in a single node. One of the
main advantages in having several nodes under monitoring is that we can perform
an aggregation of the statistics between the different nodes in order to decrease
our detection delay given a fixed false alarm rate probability. In particular if we
are monitoring nodes far away from the destination, most of the local statistics
will not yield an alarm and the attack might be unnoticed.
The alarm aggregation can be performed by several methods. Here we propose
a simple algorithm that will only require the knowledge of the routing tables for
the nodes being monitored.
We want a mechanism to aggregate the different statistics at each monitored
node. Clearly the aggregation mechanism cannot be multiplicative, because if we
are monitoring a node physically unable to detect the attack (a node that is not
in the routing path of any of the attackers and the victim) the low value of the
computed statistic of this node will adversely affect any small information that any
other node might have in relation to the attack. On the other hand the computed
statistics for all nodes can vary to different scales of magnitude yielding a biased
addition.
To cope with this latter problem we compute the normalized statistic ϕd,mk :=
gd,mk
hd,m
. If none of our monitored nodes has raised an alarm, the number of monitored




k . This can be in turned interpreted as a new
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upper bound for a collective threshold which can be selected given a false alarm
rate probability. Note the similarity of this approach with the fusion detection
from the chapter on worms.
Selecting which statistics to correlate (add) is the key issue. In keeping with our
directionality framework we will correlate only the statistics relating two or more
nodes to a common node. This is the reason we need the routing table information
of our monitored nodes.
The algorithm is as follows:
Given two nodes d and e;
For each link d→ m
For each link e→ n
If there is a node f reachable through d→ m and e→ n
then correlate their normalized statistic;
In the following section the application of the aggregation will be described, and
we will show also the relation to another suboptimal M-ary sequential detection
problem where M is the number of all possible link combinations of the two (or
more) routers that reach the same destination. We will apply this formulation to
the case of two nodes, but it extends recursively when we are monitoring three or
more nodes.
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Figure 3.3: The transit network
3.4 Simulation Results and evaluation
For our experimental results we used the network simulation software ns2. We
created a transit (scale-free) network topology given in figure 3.3 where the transit
network consists of 15 routers numbered from 0 to 14. Each cloud represents a
subnetwork whose internal architecture we are not interested in. It consists of
15 transit nodes performing only routing between each subnetwork. There are 12
subnetworks with 65 hosts each.
During the normal operation of the network each of these 780 hosts selects ran-
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domly a host in another sub network, and establishes an On-Off source connection
with Pareto distributed times. The routing protocol selects a route with the least
number of hops toward a given destination. The attack is simulated with a given
number of compromised nodes in different subnetworks. During the attack, each
of these nodes will start a constant bit rate connection toward a specific node.
The rate of the attackers was varied to test the detection algorithms with different
percentage of attack packets circulating over the transit network at a given time.
We considered 7 attackers. One in each of the subnetworks connected to nodes 3,
4, 5, 8, 9, 11 and 13. The victim is in the network connected to node 14.
Some typical link usage characteristics can be seen in figure 3.4, where node 6
uses node 0 to reach 14. An attack occupying 2.5 percent of the transit network
traffic begins at k=350.
We first tested the performance of the statistics Sd,mk and g
d,m
k at individual
nodes. With the network under normal operation we experimentally obtained the
thresholds for each statistic for a given false alarm rate of 0.003.
We selected the nodes 0, 1, 2 and 7 to test the detection delay of the statistics
independently of each other. The results can be seen in figure 3.5, showing the
average detection delay per node when we monitor individually nodes 0,1,2 and
7. A detection delay of 1 is the same as the average delay for a false alarm.
The average delay of detection is computed between the four nodes for different
percentages of the amount of traffic the attack generates over the transit network.
Node 0 had the smallest detection delay in all cases, as it is a node where most
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Figure 3.4: Link usage
Figure 3.5: Average detection delay
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of the traffic toward node 14 gets agglomerated, giving thus a large change in the
mean. Node 2 performed poorly because it only routes toward node 14 the attacks
packets generated by the attacker in the subnetwork of node 9 and thus sees very
little traffic. gd,mk performs marginally better than S
d,m
k .
The aggregation mechanism can be applied to decrease the detection delay
when we are monitoring more than one node. In previous results we mentioned
the poor performance of nodes routing very few packets toward the destination.
Lets consider the case of two nodes far (in the number of hops) from the victim.
We will pick nodes 6 and 3 for the aggregation. Node 6 routes only the malicious
traffic from the subnetwork attached to node 11 and node 3 only route malicious
traffic from its subnetwork. Furthermore if we consider an attack reaching less than
2% of the transit network traffic it will be very difficult to detect any abnormal
change without a global integrated view of the statistics at different nodes.
For testing our aggregation algorithm we will start at k=1 an attack reaching
1.5% of all traffic at the transit network. Again the attack is toward a host in the
subnetwork of node 14.
The normalized statistics are computed for each link in the nodes. The solid
dark curve in figure 3.6 is the normalized statistic for the link (3,1), the only
link that the attack uses. The dotted curves are the normalized statistics for the
links (3,13), (3,4), (3,11) and the link to its subnetwork. Figure 3.7 shows the
normalized statistics for node 6. The solid dark curve is the normalized statistic
for the link (6,0). The circles identify the statistic from node 6 to its subnetwork.
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Figure 3.6: All normalized statistics for node 3.
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Figure 3.7: All normalized statistics for node 6.
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This statistic raises a local false alarm at k=42. In both cases we can see that the
statistic closest to reaching the threshold, is not the one by the links being used
in the attack.
The routing tables required for the aggregation algorithm are given in Tables
1 and 2.







Table 3.1: Routing table for node 6
By simple inspection of the routing tables we see that we need to correlate the
link (6,0) with (3,1) because nodes 6 and 3 use them (respectively) to reach nodes
0, 1 and 14. Similarly, the link (6,11) must be correlated with (3,11), link (6,4)
with (3,4), link (6,7) with (3,13), (6,7) with (3,1) and (6,8) with (3,11).
If we denote as Hi the hypothesis when node i or its subnetwork are under
attack, then we have the following hypothesis testing problem created by the ag-
gregation mechanism
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Table 3.2: Routing table for node 3
1(H0∨ H1∨H14) = ϕ
6,0 + ϕ3,1 > h0∨1∨14
1(H11) = ϕ
6,11 + ϕ3,11 > h11
1(H4∨H5 ) = ϕ
6,4 + ϕ3,4 > h4∨5
1(H13∨H7) = ϕ
6,7 + ϕ3,13 > h13∨7
1(H2∨H10∨H12∨H9) = ϕ
6,7 + ϕ3,1 > h2∨10∨12∨9
1(H8) = ϕ
6,8 + ϕ3,11 > h8
where 1( ) is the indicator function of the Hypotheses. If we have fixed routes in
the network, the thresholds hi∨...∨j can be computed to reach a given false alarm
rate.
The results of our aggregation algorithm between all allowable normalized
statistics are shown in figure 3.8. The dark solid curve is the correlated statis-
tic of the links (6,0) and (3,1). The other dotted curves represent the correlated
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Figure 3.8: Correlated statistics.
statistics of the remaining allowable links. It is clear that the aggregation of the
normalized statistics at nodes 6 and 3 gives a better resolution of the attack than
the statistics of 6 and 3 alone while discriminating the uncorrelated random fluc-
tuations of the traffic intensity that cause most of the false alarms.
Not only can we achieve the detection of the attack (depending on the new
aggregation threshold), but also we can diminish the impact of the false alarm
originating at node 6. Another important conclusion is that without the need
to extract or store header information from the packets transmitted through the
network, we are able to infer (from the intersection of the two routing tables for
the highest correlated statistic of the links (6,0) and (3,1)) the only three possible
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targets: Namely the nodes 0, 1 and 14, i.e. hypothesis H0 ∨H1 ∨H14.
A simple marginal constant reduction in the delay detection such as that ob-
tained with gd,mk vs. S
d,m
k can provide significant help when we correlate the statis-
tics because constant gains will get multiplied by the number of nodes participating
in the detection reducing exponentially the detection delay.
3.5 Conclusions and further work
Note that one main difference between Sd,mk and g
d,m
k is that for testing a change in
the link m, Sd,mk does not use information from the other links of node d whereas
gd,mk does. A possible use of the information contained in all the links from d is
to compute a statistic that measures the changes in the normalized traffic seen






This approach has the added advantage that a positive change in the mean of
ρd,mk tends to yield a negative change in the mean on any other neighbor n of d as
ρd,mk and ρ
d,n
k for n 




. Experimental validation shows that the process ρd,mk has less variations than its
normalized counterpart and will be more amenable to a mean computation and
the usage of the CUSUM nonparametric statistic.
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A way to complement the use of the direction concept in the formulation of the
statistic is by testing each possible direction against a change in all directions (Υd))















where λ is a scalar not necessarily greater than a positive constant c1 unlike ν.
Optimal solutions to the problem of sequential testing of more than two hy-
potheses are, in general, intractable. Hence research in sequential multi-hypotheses
testing has been directed toward the study of practical, suboptimal sequential tests
and the evaluation of their asymptotic performance. Simple generalizations of the
Wald’s binary SPRT, such as a parallel implementation of a set of simple SPRT’s,
may be far from optimum in multi-hypotheses problems [15].
In [15] a proof of asymptotic optimality as the decision risks (or error probabil-
ities) go to zero for two nontrivial extensions of the SPRT are presented. The tests
are also asymptotically optimal to any positive moment of the stopping time dis-
tribution, and the results are extended to continuous-time statistical models that
may include correlated (non-i.i.d.) and non-homogeneous observation processes.
This generalization justifies the use of these tests in a variety of applications.
Our M-ary change detection procedure used in this chapter is thus suboptimal.
We could improve results by following the optimal detection procedures.
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Chapter 4
Detection of routing attacks in MANETS
4.1 Attacks to the routing protocols
Mobile -wireless- ad hoc networks (MANETS) are particularly vulnerable to at-
tacks to the routing protocols. Unlike fixed networks, the routers usually do not
reside in physically protected places and can fall under the control of an attacker
more easily. Such an attacker can then send incorrect routing information. Fur-
thermore messages can be eavesdropped and faked messages can be injected into
the network without the need to compromise nodes.
General attacks are misrouting, false message propagation, packet dropping,
packet generation with faked source address, corruption on packet contents and
denial-of-service [16, 17]. In [18] they consider up to 40% misbehaving nodes which
agree to forward packets but fail to do so. Solutions are based on identifying these
nodes and avoiding them. Detection is made by listening promiscuously to the
next node’s transmissions. If the next node does not forward the packet, then it
is misbehaving.
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One of the attacks exploiting the wireless medium is the wormhole attack. In
this problem an attacker records packets or bits at one location in the network
and tunnels them to another location by means of a single long-range directional
wireless link or through a direct wired link to a colluding attacker. At the end of
the tunnel certain packets are retransmitted into the network [19]. The wormhole
attack can be devastating to a routing protocol. For example in DSDV if each
routing advertising sent by node A were tunneled to node B (and any data packet
is not retransmitted) and vice versa, then A and B would believe that they are
neighbors. If they were not within wireless transmission range, they would be
unable to communicate. Furthermore, if the best existing route from A to B were
at least 2n+2 hops long, then any node within n hops of A would be unable to
communicate with B and vice versa.
4.1.1 Related work
To our knowledge there is only one publication on intrusion detection for mobile
ad hoc networks [20]. Besides describing the overall architecture of the IDS, their
approach consists in training two classification algorithms for the simulation of
attacks falsifying routing information and dropping packets. The classification
algorithms used were support vector machines (SVMs) and RIPPER (a rule in-
duction algorithm). Features such as the percentage of changes in a routing table
in a given amount of time, position of the nodes obtained from GPS devices, and
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Figure 4.1: Allowed state transitions in an ad hoc network
percentage of traffic change were considered. There is no deductive modeling of the
intrusions; although rules are induced by RIPPER but their performance is not as
good as the SVM decisions, which do not provide any insight on the classification
of the attacks.
4.2 Problem formulation
Our approach is mostly an academic exercise for building a model capturing the
dynamics of a highly mobile ad hoc network. The basic idea is that an attacker
will change the routing information in such a way that our perceived mobility of
the nodes will differ from our previous experience.
We want to learn the allowable state transitions (which depend in our sampling
interval.) In figure 4.1 we have a simple scenario in which node 3 moves toward
node 1 and we have 2 possible transitions. It can be the case that based on the
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Figure 4.2: Codebook of size 10 of the hop count distribution
mobility pattern for the network, only transition to state B is allowed (e.g. node
3 can not move fast relative to 1.) For establishing a baseline of the allowable
state transitions we build a discrete hidden Markov model (HMM) with param-
eters (π,A,B) for modeling the temporal relations of various statistics encoding
the underlying mobility of the nodes. The states of the HMM can be viewed as
abstractions of different spatial configurations of the mobile nodes. We will pick
the observation variable to be the hop count distribution at a given node (figure
4.2.) For simplicity we will assume a proactive distance vector routing protocol
such as DSDV in order to have all hop counts at any time.
If we have N nodes (actually N +1 but each node see only N other nodes), the
hop count distribution seen at any node at the time step k can be considered as a
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vector in {0, ..., N}D: Xk = [X0k , ..., XD−1k ]′ (X ik ∈ {0, ..., N} where D is a limit we
impose in the maximum number of hops we will consider, i.e.
X0k = number of nodes 0 hops away (disconnected and itself)
X1k = number of nodes 1 hop away
...
XD−2k = number of nodes D − 2 hops away
XD−1k = number of nodes D − 1 or more hops away (4.1)
In order to consider a discrete HMM we need a way to deal with the high-
dimensional observation vectors Xk. The number of all possible observations is




k = N + 1. The most natural approach is to quantize (compress) Xk to
a set of M codewords. The codebook Ξ for vector quantization can be learned by
using the classic LBG algorithm, in which for a given fixed rate R, one tries to
find the codebook that minimizes the given distortion function. We will consider a
quadratic distortion. Figure (4.2) shows a typical codebook of size 10 obtained for
the hop count distribution under the mobility model discussed in the simulations
section.
In order to continue in the change detection setup we follow a CUSUM pro-
cedure applicable to the case of dependent observations xj with distributions fθ1
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where xk is the first sample after the last reset, i.e., Sk−1 = 0. It is clear that






with the lower threshold selected at 0. The upper
threshold h will be selected given a false alarm rate.
In the field of intrusion detection most statistic models are built for anomaly
detection. In the case of observations in a finite alphabet (the codebook in our
case) the alternate hypothesis can be considered as the uniform distribution, i.e.
∀x̂ ∈ Ξ (P (x̂) = 1/M) . This is a way of not assuming anything about the attack
and therefore it is particularly suited for detecting the attacks we do not know
of. So under the assumption that we have an HMM model (πθ0 , Aθ0, Bθ0) for the
normal operation of the network, equation (4.2) can be reduced to
Sn = (Sn−1 + log(1/M) − log fθ0(x̂k, ..., x̂n) + log fθ0(x̂k, ..., x̂n−1))+ (4.3)
where ∀k, x̂k ∈ Ξ.
4.3 Simulation results
The simulations take place in a 1000x1000m2 region with 40 nodes moving at
speeds of 5m/s and with a communication range of 250m. For the mobility of the
nodes we used the standard random waypoint algorithm in which the nodes select
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Figure 4.3: Codeword transitions with two nodes sending bad routing information
at random
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with a uniform distribution a destination point from the region and after reaching
their target they remain there for a given amount of time (5s in our simulation)
before selecting again another destination. We will be assuming that we monitor
one node in which the hop count distribution is sampled every two seconds. A
total simulated time of four hours was selected. The HMM is trained with the
first 3600 samples. In the following 1800 samples the nodes continue to behave
normally and in the final 1800 samples the attack takes place.
A second mobility model considered (avw mobility) is one in a 52x42m2 U-
shaped building where there are 47 offices and 47 nodes. Each node spends most
of the time in its home office and travels with a speed of 1m/s among different
offices selected at random. Each node has a communication range of 11m. A total
simulated time of one hour was selected and the time step between measurements
was 2 seconds.
The prior is initialized as a uniform distribution. The number of states is
selected to be equal to the number of observations and both matrices Aθ0 and Bθ0
are initialized with higher values in their respective diagonal component than the
rest of the values.
The first attack we simulated was an artificial attack to take advantage of the
HMM. Under this scenario two nodes start sending bad routing information ran-
domly at any given time about their distance to any other node. The spurious
pattern of the attack caused by the random attack produces more codewords tran-
sitions as seen in figure (4.3). As seen in figure (4.4), the attack was easily detected
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Figure 4.4: Change detection statistic for attack 1
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Figure 4.5: Change detection statistic for a wormhole attack
using equation (4.4).
The second scenario considers a wormhole attack, where the endpoints of the
wormhole are located at x, y coordinates (1000/3, 500)m and (2000/3, 500)m for
the 1000x1000m2 plane. This attack was also detected using equation (4.4). How-
ever, we can see in figure 4.5 that the statistic is not robust to the change.
A way to improve the performance is by including information on the attack.
We trained another HMM (πθ1 , Aθ1, Bθ1) for the attack mode. The resulting per-
formance of this new change detection statistic between two HMMs can be seen in
figure 4.6.
The performance of the change detection statistics to the wormhole attack
is similar to an attack in which one node is sending bad routing information con-
stantly. However in this case, a batch detection procedure by testing the likelihood
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Figure 4.6: Change detection statistic when we have an HMM model of the attack
of the state transitions for a given window of time seems to perform better when
we do not have an HMM of the attack. In figure 4.7 we can see that the state
transitions of a normal sequence have in average a higher log-likelihood value than
the states transitions from the attack. Figure 4.8 is the ROC curve.
Another way to deal with the problem is to build a more complex HMM.
A natural generalization to avoid the dependence of the detection on the trained
codebook is to consider directly the continuous hop count distribution vector Xk ∈

D . To deal with this continuous vector we trained an HMM with a mixture of
two Gaussians with two hidden states. With continuous observations we also need
a fixed interval in D for defining the uniform probability distribution. However
we decided to estimate the mean of the likelihood fGaussianHMMθ0 (xn|xn−1, ..., xk)
for any new time step xn, to replace the distribution log 1/M . The resulting
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Figure 4.7: Log-likelihood of state transitions















Figure 4.8: ROC curve for batch detection
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Figure 4.9: Change detection statistic using a Gaussian mixture output HMM
performance of the statistic is shown in figure (4.9).
4.4 Conclusions and further work
Although the attacks introduced can be detected by very different and easy means,
the principle of detecting an unknown attack to the routing protocol with different
characteristics was obtained. In particular, attack 1 produces a change in the
variance of the hop count distribution, and attack 2 produces a change in the
mean of the hop count distribution. Both attacks were detected by simply testing
on the likelihood of our learned model.
The drawbacks of any anomaly detection approach are that we always need to
assume that we can train our model in an attack free environment. Issues we have
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to study further is the amount of time required for training our normal model, and
the dependence on the mobility pattern.
Another of the main limitations is that it flags as an alarm any deviation from
normal conditions and determining a normal baseline for ad hoc networks might




In this thesis we have presented new approaches to detect intrusions using a sta-
tistical framework.
The detection of self-propagating code was discovered to depend on the net-
work connectivity. For traffic satisfying the parametric assumptions the statistics
“fusion” “aggregate cusum” and “exponential change in mean” perform better
than the others. When the traffic has a long range dependence, the nonparametric
statistics “regression” and “robust regression” perform better. However this de-
pends highly on the burst spikes of the normal traffic and their performance will
degrade as the traffic becomes more bursty.
In the detection of denial of service attacks we introduced a new directionality
framework to improve the detection in transit networks from statistics using only a
change in one link. In real networks it is very likely that the sensors will be placed
at the peering routers because these routers will be close to the target. So to apply
our framework for detecting the transit routers we can use a change detection
statistic with a prior in the change time. The change time will be assumed to be
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the time when the alarm is set from one of the peering routers.
For ad hoc networks we presented a new formulation for representing the mo-
bility of the nodes. In practice the mobility might have very large variations and
therefore a model robust to these normal changes must be studied.
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